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Introduction
The Solomon Islands Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) was the first truth commission 
in the Pacific, established under the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Act 20081 (TRC 
Act) in an effort to ‘promote national unity and 
reconciliation’ following the civil conflict which 
troubled the country between 1998 and 2003. The 
commission was publicly launched in 2008 by 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, former Chair of the 
South African TRC, and officially began operations 
in 2010 for two years. The commission presented 
its five-volume final report to Prime Minister 
Gordon Darcy Lilo in February 2012; however, the 
report has yet to be publicly released or presented 
to parliament, despite requirements in the Act to 
do so. The ongoing silence of the government led 
to the editor of the final report, long-term Solomon 
Islands resident Bishop Terry Brown, unofficially 
releasing the report electronically in early 2013.
The TRC conducted exhumations, research, 
closed hearings and statement taking across six 
of the nine provinces,2 overcoming financial 
constraints, logistical challenges and difficult 
terrain. Several regional and thematic public 
hearings were also held and broadcast on the 
radio. The final report was handed over to the 
prime minister within the allocated two-year 
time frame. In light of these achievements, the 
Solomon Islands TRC could be considered a 
‘success’ insomuch as it fulfilled its mandated 
duties and produced a final report — a challenging 
and remarkable achievement itself. This success, 
however, was arguably superficial, a performance 
of reconciliation in the theatre of post-conflict 
peacebuilding. A wider perspective of post-conflict 
peacebuilding and reconciliation in the Solomon 
Islands shows the TRC was a minor player on 
a crowded stage. Many Solomon Islanders were 
unaware of the TRC, and those familiar with its 
acronym or name were often unaware of its role 
or mandate.
This paper contends that although the Solomon 
Islands TRC replicated the structure and operation 
of a truth commission based on a globalised and 
placeless theory of best practice in transitional 
justice, the TRC was not adequately contextualised 
or integrated with local approaches to reconciliation 
and peacebuilding and therefore fell short of its 
ambitious mandate. The commission did, however, 
produce a final report which in and of itself may 
serve as a positive outcome of the commission’s 
work. The experience of the Solomon Islands 
TRC demonstrates not only the conceptual and 
practical challenges faced and friction experienced 
of implementing a truth commission, but also 
the potential that truth commissions offer for 
promoting reconciliation and peacebuilding in post-
conflict contexts in Melanesia.
This paper is divided into six parts. First, a 
brief background of the Solomon Islands conflict 
is outlined. Second, the recent evolution of the 
peacebuilding and transitional justice fields 
are discussed to offer a background for the 
Solomon Islands TRC. Third, the various conflict 
management and reconciliation practices in 
Solomon Islands are outlined, leading to the fourth 
part which introduces and describes the background 
of the Solomon Islands TRC. The challenges of 
and failures to adapt the TRC to the local context 
are illustrated in the fifth part, with a discussion 
focused on the mistranslation of the meaning and 
value of both ‘truth’ and ‘reconciliation’ in post-
conflict Solomon Islands. Finally, 
the sixth part argues that despite 
being initially championed by 
civil society actors, rather than 
becoming a ‘hybridised’ institution, 







the commission had a veneer of adaptation, and 
was ‘replicated’ according to normative transitional 
justice discourse.
Methodology
This paper is informed by two sets of data. First, 
I draw on my experiences, observations and 
reflections while working as a research officer at 
the Solomon Islands TRC for one year between 
2011 and 2012. Second, I draw on interviews with 
TRC staff and stakeholders about their experiences 
and perspectives of the commission, and 
reconciliation and peacebuilding in the country 
more generally.3
Working at the TRC enabled and strengthened 
my academic research and efforts were made to 
incorporate lessons learned while working for the 
TRC into the research design. Of note, there was 
an overwhelming sense of research fatigue and 
suspicion among villagers when approached by 
TRC staff to discuss the period of conflict. Many 
were reluctant to talk of the past, having done so 
many times before to no perceivable avail. With 
this ‘research fatigue’ in mind, and cautious of the 
sensitive nature of researching peace and conflict 
as an outsider, I specifically limited interviewees to 
former colleagues and stakeholders of the TRC and 
trusted acquaintances — people with whom I had 
established trust and rapport. The potential for the 
research to have ongoing and applicable benefits 
for the Solomon Islands and the Pacific was a 
significant factor for the research participants. They 
appeared to value the opportunity to reflect on 
their experiences with the TRC, and peacebuilding 
and reconciliation in Solomon Islands generally.
1. Tensions and Transition in Solomon 
Islands
The conflict in the Solomon Islands, locally 
referred to as ‘the tensions,’ troubled the nation 
between 1998 and 2003.4 The conflict manifested 
primarily between militant groups from the 
two most populated provinces, Malaita and 
Guadalcanal. At times referred to as a ‘small-
scale’ conflict, causing an estimated 200 conflict-
related deaths,5 its devastating and ongoing 
effects extended across the entire population. An 
estimated 35,000 people (Norwegian Refugee 
Council 2004, 5) — 10 per cent of the population 
— were displaced from their homes, and many 
suffered torture, abduction and sexual violence. The 
economy was bankrupted, government-run services 
were severely disrupted and the police force was 
divided (Allen 2006, 310).
Though often referred to as an ‘ethnic conflict’ 
or the ‘ethnic tensions’, the roots of the conflict 
are embedded in socio-economic, development, 
political and land issues rather than in an 
intractable divide between the groups involved 
(Kabutaulaka 2002, 4; Maebuta et al. 2009, 7). 
While initial stages of the tensions saw conflict 
manifest primarily along provincial identity lines, 
much violence also occurred within the respective 
groups as old grievances were raised, inflated 
compensation demanded, and accusations of not 
supporting the local militants — or being a ‘spear’ 
— were made.
Meanwhile, Solomon Islanders worked together 
across provincial identities in efforts towards 
building peace and reconciliation during and 
after the conflict. Efforts included formation and 
operation of ‘Women for Peace’ at the height of the 
conflict, including subgroups from Guadalcanal and 
Malaita (Paina 2000; Pollard 2000); mediating and 
peacemaking work by local church organisations 
such as the Melanesian Brotherhood (see Carter 
2006); ex-militants reconciling within prison 
(Braithwaite et al. 2010, 146); and chiefs and 
church leaders across the affected areas conducting 
reconciliations in their communities (Maebuta 
et al. 2009). The strength of local institutions and 
their ability to maintain social order meant that 
most Solomon Islanders were not directly affected 
by violence and were able to continue with their 
lives (McDougall and Kere 2011, 142). The late 
John Roughan, founder of the Solomon Islands 
Development Trust, recounted a conversation he 
had when he met two senior Australian police. He 
asked them to allow him to ask a question: ‘I said 
“how long would Sydney last if it had no police 
force, no security force, no army, how long?” They 
both looked at each other and they said, “about a 
week.” I said, “That’s alright. This so-called failed 
state lasted five years.” ’6
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The conflict officially ended with the arrival 
of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon 
Islands (RAMSI) in July 2003. The Australian-led 
regional mission to ‘restore law and order’ centred 
on three core pillars of recovery: machinery of 
government, economic governance, and law and 
justice. The mission’s efforts involved the removal 
of weapons, criminal prosecutions, institutional 
strengthening and capacity-building.7 While the 
country now enjoys relative law and order, peace 
is nevertheless ‘uneasy’ (Jeffery 2013, 172), and 
Allen and Dinnen (2010, 323) question if RAMSI’s 
‘haste to arrest, prosecute, liberalise and state-build’ 
allowed sufficient space for indigenous methods of 
peacemaking.
2. Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice
In contemporary post-conflict contexts, particu-
larly in the case of Solomon Islands and RAMSI, 
the term peacebuilding is often understood and 
defined within a liberal peace paradigm. This 
approach links the restoration of security and 
peace to state-building and governance, empha-
sising democratisation, economic reform, human 
rights and the rule of law, and development pro-
gramming; thus conflating peacebuilding with 
state-building (Brown et al. 2010; Richmond 2010, 
23). Following the Cold War, international actors 
such as the United Nations, non-government 
organisations and international financial institu-
tions became increasingly involved in liberal peace 
projects linked to peacekeeping operations. The 
RAMSI intervention closely followed this model for 
state-building in a post–September 11 world, where 
‘the fragility of the state was seen to be potentially 
destabilising for the region’ (Richmond 2011, 125).
Peace studies and peace researchers, however, 
employ a broader conception of ‘sustainable 
peace’ and peacebuilding than the liberal peace 
agenda and its focus on state-building. From this 
perspective, violence and conflict are not limited to 
physical manifestations but extend also to cultural 
and structural forms (Galtung 1969; Reychler 2001, 
12). So peacebuilding is concerned not only with 
ending armed conflict and (re)building institutions, 
but also with transforming relationships and 
promoting ‘reconciliation’ (Lambourne 2009, 
34–35; Lederach 1997). For the purpose of this 
paper, the latter holistic and transformative 
definition of peacebuilding is the benchmark 
against which the Solomon Islands TRC will be 
considered, as this is the approach instigators of 
the TRC initially aimed for. This is evident in 
the TRC’s initial terms of reference and mandate, 
which demonstrate goals for similarly holistic and 
reconciliatory outcomes.8
Evolving as a separate field to peace and 
conflict studies, transitional justice is similarly 
concerned with post-conflict peacebuilding. 
Initially, the term ‘transitional justice’ was 
used in contexts of political change, from 
repressive or undemocratic regimes to ones 
seeking accountability or justice for past abuses 
(Lambourne 2009, 29; Teitel 2003, 69). Later, 
the term was defined by the United Nations in 
relation to post-conflict peace and reconciliation 
goals (Lambourne 2009, 29; UNSC 2004). The 
International Center for Transitional Justice defines 
transitional justice as ‘the set of judicial and non-
judicial measures that have been implemented by 
different countries in order to redress the legacies 
of massive human rights abuses’.9 Measures may 
include amnesties, lustration policies, prosecutions, 
compensation, reparations, memorialisation, 
institutional reform and truth commissions.
Truth commissions became popular as an 
accountability mechanism in contexts where truth 
had been concealed or withheld by governments 
and was therefore highly valued. However, truth 
commissions have since become standardised and 
globalised following conflict or political repression, 
and an active domain of post-conflict policy 
practised and supported by the United Nations, 
regional organisations, bilateral donors and 
governments around the world (Shaw and Waldorf 
2010, 3; Sriram 2007, 583; Teitel 2003; UNSC 
2004). Truth commissions are generally officially 
sanctioned, temporary, non-judicial investigative 
bodies mandated to conduct activities such as 
statement taking, public hearings, exhumations, 
research and investigations for the production 
of a final report that describes the patterns of 
abuses and violence, its antecedents, causes and 
consequences (OHCHR 2006, 1). While they 







do not replace the need for prosecutions and 
formal judicial processes, truth commissions 
may complement these processes, especially in 
situations in which prosecutions are not likely 
(OHCHR 2006, 1). Globally, more than 40 truth 
commissions have operated to date; however, 
they vary in name, composition and purpose. Like 
restorative justice measures, truth commissions 
focus on victims as well as perpetrators, and their 
affected communities, giving voice to those who 
may otherwise go unheard. Truth commissions 
are not implemented by overarching international 
law, nor are their form or function necessarily 
directed or prescribed (Millar 2011, 179). Earlier 
commissions, however, have served as templates 
for later iterations resulting in a set of globalised 
norms in their implementation. Truth commissions 
share common characteristics that ‘are included 
based on their theorized ability to produce certain 
social effects in response to particular abuses of 
the past’ (Millar 2011, 180). Truth commissions 
operate under premises such as that the process of 
recovering the truth will result in psychological 
healing; that without truth, there is no justice; and 
that without knowledge of the past, human rights 
violations will recur.
Advocates of truth-seeking claim commissions 
deter future crimes, assure justice, promote social 
and psychological healing, outline needed reforms, 
and promote reconciliation and respect for human 
rights (Freeman and Hayner 2003). Yet debates 
persist on whether these claims are compelling, 
or the relationship between truth-telling and 
reconciliation or peacebuilding justified (Chapman 
2009b; Mendeloff 2004; Tepperman 2002). David 
Mendeloff systematically considers the claims 
made of the peace-promoting benefits of truth 
commissions and concludes that they ‘rest far more 
on faith than on sound logic or empirical evidence’ 
(2004, 356). Scholars also question the validity of 
truth commissions in the range of cultural contexts 
in which they are applied, inquiring how official 
transitional justice discourses are appropriated, 
negotiated, contested and transformed (Hinton 
2010; Kent 2011; Millar 2011; Ross 2010; Shaw 
2005; Shaw and Waldorf 2010; Sriram 2007).
Both peacebuilding and transitional justice 
fields are concerned with ‘reconciliation’. The term 
is often stipulated as a goal of truth commissions 
and sometimes included in their title, as in the 
Solomon Islands TRC. Reconciliation after conflict 
has increasingly become a priority as post–Cold 
War conflicts occur within, rather than between, 
states. Sharing the same geographical areas and 
often linked through marriage and other social and 
economic ties, former combatants cannot be easily 
separated and must learn to coexist (Assefa 2001, 
339). Reconciliation is associated with a range of 
approaches: the psychosocial, legal, religious, socio-
economic and anthropological, and is difficult to 
define (Millar 2011, 177). Definitions range from 
referring to simply the absence of violence, to also 
including coexistence, positive relationships, and 
intergroup harmony and cooperation (Bloomfield 
2006; Mendeloff 2004, 365–66). Reconciliation can 
also be distinguished between the individual level 
and national and political reconciliation. Truth 
commissions are often associated with larger social 
or political processes of reconciliation.
Localising Peacebuilding
Largely subsumed by ‘the liberal peacebuilding 
apparatus’, transitional justice is subject to similar 
critiques as the liberal peace agenda, such as it may 
be ‘externally imposed and inappropriate for the 
political and legal cultures in which they are set 
up’ (Sriram 2007, 579 and 586). Dominant, liberal 
post-conflict approaches are criticised for viewing 
peacebuilding as a series of technocratic tasks that 
focus narrowly on democratisation and institutional 
reform. Critics argue that local dynamics, such 
as local sources of strength or resilience, and the 
affective dimensions of peacebuilding such as 
trust-building and reconciliation, are consequently 
neglected (Bleiker and Brigg 2011; Brown et al. 
2010, 103; Ginty 2003, 125–26; Richmond 2011, 
115). Critical scholars increasingly place emphasis 
on the value of grassroots, local, indigenous 
and hybridised models of conflict resolution, 
peacemaking and state-building in what are 
referred to as ‘hybrid’ or ‘liberal-local’ approaches 
(Bleiker and Brigg 2011; Boege 2007; Boege et al. 
2008; Ginty 2003, 2008; Richmond 2011; Wallis 
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2012). Transitional justice scholars similarly 
emphasise the need to localise mechanisms to 
better adapt to or suit the local context and call for 
empirical research evaluating successes, limitations 
and impacts to inform policy decisions (Baxter 
2009; Shaw and Waldorf 2010).
Local approaches, while ‘necessarily rooted in 
specific communities and thus may have highly 
localised elements’ generally share a number of 
common traits that lend them to more sustainable 
peacebuilding (Ginty 2010, 349). These include 
engaging respected local figures with moral 
authority; involving a public element making 
them more transparent and accessible (such as 
being physically located in the community or 
between disputing communities); using oral 
traditions such as storytelling and publicly airing 
grievances; emphasising relationships rather 
than a definitive agreement; and lastly, relying 
on local resources (Ginty 2010, 349–50). Each of 
these elements is relevant to conflict management 
processes in Solomon Islands, as discussed in the 
following section.
Those advocating hybrid or liberal-local 
approaches to peace and state-building are aware of 
the limitations and risks involved. Caution is made 
against lapsing into cultural relativism or reifying 
the ‘local’ as a homogenous category and placing 
it in a dichotomous relationship with the ‘external’, 
‘liberal’, or ‘Western’ (Wallis 2012, 631). References 
to ‘customary ways’ should not be interpreted as 
practices of the precolonial or pre-contact past, nor 
should ‘custom’ be viewed as static, ‘but remarkably 
dynamic and adaptable’ (Brown et al. 2010, 102). 
In this paper, the term ‘local’ is used to refer to 
the everyday social reality of Solomon Islanders, 
which may include a variety of customary 
structures or processes, spiritual and religious 
beliefs, state institutions and global influences 
(Richmond 2011, 117). Similarly, ‘hybrid’ is 
not limited to mutual accommodation between 
local and liberal approaches, but also refers to a 
combination of the multitude and diverse forms 
of local practices within Solomon Islands, which 
Solomon Islanders regularly navigate when 
mediating across cultural differences (McDougall 
and Kere 2011). Limitations and drawbacks of 
hybridity are identified in the literature to warn 
against romanticising ‘the local’, and to prompt 
researchers and policymakers to contextualise 
responses and judge techniques according to their 
efficacy (Ginty 2010, 359–60; Peterson 2012, 12). 
While most post-conflict contexts already employ a 
mix of peacebuilding mechanisms that draw from 
local and external techniques, the key issue is ‘who 
determines the mix’ (Ginty 2010, 360–61).
Although policymakers and scholars recognise 
the value of local models of conflict management 
and adapting peacebuilding and transitional justice 
mechanisms to local contexts, in practice this 
view is often neglected, or superficially included 
as another criterion to be met. The foundation 
assumptions underlying truth commissions 
continue to be reiterated without significant 
modification as TRCs are replicated around the 
globe (Shaw and Waldorf 2010, 4). While truth 
commissions promote a host of seemingly universal 
goods such as human rights, justice, healing, peace 
and reconciliation, these ideas can be abstract 
and ambiguous and may not necessarily resonate 
with local sociocultural understandings (Hinton 
2010, 11). When mimicked or replicated, the 
original intention and meaning can be easily lost 
or mistranslated, and the processes carried out in 
name only. This results in a performance which, 
on paper, may meet criteria for ‘best practice’ or 
‘success’, but in reality falls short of a meaningful 
process congruent with local world views and 
cultures, capable of resonating with the population 
(Ginty 2010, 356). Sally Engle Merry (2006) uses 
the term ‘vernacularisation’ to refer to the process 
whereby intermediaries attempt to frame globally 
circulating ideas and practices, such as human 
rights, into local conceptual understandings — a 
messy process of translation between international 
and local actors. She depicts the process as 
occurring along a continuum:
At one end is replication, a process in which 
the imported institution remains largely 
unchanged from its transnational prototype. 
The adaptation is superficial and primarily 
decorative. At the other end is hybridization, 







a process that merges imported institutions 
and symbols with local ones, sometimes 
uneasily. (Merry 2006, 44)
Although the Solomon Islands TRC was 
instigated locally, implemented through an Act of 
parliament, staffed mostly by Solomon Islanders, 
and partly funded by the Solomon Islands 
Government, rather than becoming a ‘hybridised’ 
institution, the commission was ‘replicated’ 
according to normative transitional justice 
discourse. Shifting from the civil society sphere 
where it began, the Solomon Islands TRC became 
a responsibility of the government and thus moved 
to a domain with less trust and traction to operate 
such a sensitive process regarding ‘matters of the 
heart’. Foreign consultants and the International 
Center for Transitional Justice provided welcome 
support and guidance; two of the commissioners 
were foreigners; and being mostly funded by 
international donors, namely the European 
Union, United Nations Development Programme, 
AusAID and NZAID, the Solomon Islands TRC 
had to comply with standardised global models 
of organisation, governance and administration. 
While these external actors provided welcome 
support, guidance and funding, the TRC was 
simultaneously pulled closer to the globalised 
transitional justice model and further from a 
hybridised and localised approach.
3. Reconciliation and Peacebuilding in 
Solomon Islands
Around 85 per cent of Solomon Islanders live in 
rural areas on customary-owned land and practise 
subsistence livelihoods in village settings (Allen 
and Dinnen 2010, 303). Identity is primarily 
centred around wantok or tribe loyalties rather 
than the state, as Kabutaulaka explains: ‘For 
many Solomon Islanders national consciousness 
is often only skin deep: peel it off and you find 
a person with allegiances to a particular wantok 
or ethnic group; most people carry competing 
identities between their island and their country’ 
(Kabutaulaka 2002, 4). While Solomon Islanders 
live mostly in rural or remote areas, these villages 
‘can be strikingly cosmopolitan places, where 
residents are constantly dealing with people who 
speak different languages and where intercultural 
marriages are common’ (McDougall and Kere 
2011, 147).
Social norms and local-level systems for 
governing conflict and reconciliation are rooted 
in a combination of kastom, Christianity and 
introduced forms of Western governance, and 
Solomon Islanders are adept at mediating across 
cultural differences and managing conflict ‘by 
drawing from within and beyond their traditions as 
circumstances require’ (McDougall and Kere 2011, 
145). A recent World Bank report for the Justice 
Delivered Locally project found that in local-level 
disputes, the kastom system was ‘by far the most 
commonly invoked’ (Allen et al. 2013, 34). The 
weak reach of the state into rural areas means that 
state institutions are peripheral to the majority 
of Solomon Islanders and security and justice is 
mostly provided by customary or local institutions 
and actors. Christianity, however, is a unifying 
force across the country and, when linked with 
kastom and indigenous practices of reconciliation, 
has proved useful in managing and transcending 
conflict (Braithwaite et al. 2010, 15; McDougall and 
Kere 2011, 155–56).
Kastom, a Pijin term widely used across 
the Solomon Islands, is highly subjective and 
without formal definition, taking on ‘specific 
historical, political and place-based meanings’ 
(Allen et al. 2013, 6). Broadly defined, kastom 
encompasses indigenous ideologies, relationship 
to and management of land, moral frameworks, 
dispute management, gender relations and social 
organisation (White 1993, 492). It also contains a 
political dimension, serving to empower indigenous 
traditions and practices within communities and 
as a stance towards the state or outside actors 
(Akin 2004, 300; Allen 2013, 16). Kastom is not, 
however, dichotomous from either the West or 
‘modern’. It is dynamic, fluid and evolving, existing 
alongside and in interplay with Western forms of 
governance and Christianity (Allen et al. 2013, 34; 
Brown 2008, 190). Failure to enable and support 
conflict prevention at the village level by chiefs 
and churches has been a crucial weakness in the 
justice system: ‘This was the form of justice that 
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the People’s Surveys showed 90 per cent of citizens 
value most highly’ (Braithwaite et al. 2010, 139).
Customary approaches to conflict management 
vary across Solomon Islands, yet they share 
important features such as the exchange of goods 
or compensation, speeches, and opening a space 
for interaction (McDougall and Kere 2011, 151). 
The mutual exchange of traditional items of wealth, 
such as shell money or feather money, pigs or taro, 
as well as modern goods or money, serve to ‘cover’ 
the offence or conflict, after which it is usually not 
appropriate to speak of again (McDougall and Kere 
2011, 153). This process of reconciliation, or ‘doing 
custom’, addresses the issue through a process 
of restoring productive working relationships 
and societal equilibrium (McDougall and Kere 
2011, 151; Pollard and Wale 2004, 588). As Father 
Arkwright explains:
Compensation is a word that comes with a 
vast variety of meanings and ramifications. 
Mainly it has something to do with 
restoration or recognition of injured dignity 
or status. It is what is due to the person, 
not in material possessions but to restore a 
relationship. (Arkwright 2003, 181)
Reconciliation in Solomon Islands is centred 
around this primarily interpersonal, inter-familial 
and intercommunal process. As one TRC research 
officer explained:
The understanding of people in the village, 
if they say reconciliation, there will be 
two parties, and there will be a symbolic 
exchange of maybe goods and money. Which 
symbolises that you’re sorry and things like 
that. Not necessarily repaying everything … 
It symbolises understanding that a problem 
has happened, and we forget it. It should be 
addressed. And then, don’t do it again … If 
there’s any problem next time, it will mean it’s 
a different problem.10
Locating post-conflict peacebuilding practices 
into this local contextual understanding of 
reconciliation is necessary to understand the 
potential effectiveness of a TRC in Melanesia.
4. Solomon Islands TRC: Visions and 
Background
Transitional justice in post-conflict Solomon Islands 
has not been formally planned, yet mechanisms 
have been adopted ‘organically’ and on an ‘ad-hoc 
basis’ (Jeffery 2013). The Solomon Islands TRC 
was first proposed at the height of the tensions in 
2000 by a Peace Committee established within the 
Solomon Islands Christian Association (SICA). It 
was seen as a potential means to ‘build national 
unity’ through truth-telling, reconciliation and 
justice or amnesty processes (SICA 2002, 6). A 
Truth and Reconciliation Reference Group was 
established following a church leaders’ conference. 
The reference group received advice from the 
principal legal counsel to the South African TRC, 
who at the time was the head of the Human Rights 
Unit at the Commonwealth Secretariat in London, 
and a framework for public consultation was 
developed and distributed (SICA 2002, 2). The 
framework, published in a small pink pamphlet, 
noted sociopolitical factors at the time which were 
favourable to a truth commission process, such as 
the relatively short period of armed conflict, the 
limited number of incidents and perpetrators, that 
former militants continued to retain weapons and 
exercise influence, that prosecutions for conflict-
related crimes had yet to occur, and that future 
peace was uncertain (SICA 2002, 5–6). The strength 
of kastom, reconciliation traditions and Christianity, 
as well as an impartial and independent judiciary, 
were also noted as local strengths conducive to a 
TRC process (ibid.). Truth was seen as a means 
to reconciliation, which would be the primary 
outcome of the process:
The goal of the process is to build national 
unity. The process should target reconciliation 
as its primary outcome, but we must find 
and know the truth in order to reconcile 
… Reconciliation between victim and 
perpetrator, perpetrator and village and within 
the nation as a whole should be the primary 
goal of the truth, justice and reconciliation 
process in Solomon Islands. (SICA 2002, 6 
and 11)







The SICA Peace Committee conducted a 
community-wide dialogue on the proposed TRC 
framework from November 2002 until August 
2003. Response from the consultations was 
positive; however, with the arrival of RAMSI and 
its law and order agenda, momentum for a TRC 
stalled. The SICA Peace Committee morphed into 
SICA and lost momentum to advocate for and 
champion the TRC.11 Neither peacebuilding nor 
reconciliation were included in RAMSI’s mandate, 
nor did RAMSI work in direct partnership with 
the Ministry for National Unity, Reconciliation and 
Peace, a government ministry that did not come 
under any of RAMSI’s core pillars (Braithwaite et 
al. 2010, 86). Without the backing of RAMSI, or 
a strong leader or organisation to champion the 
TRC, reconciliation was ‘crowded’ off the policy 
agenda (Braithwaite et al. 2010, 81).
Following a change in the Solomon Islands 
Government in 2006, there was a policy of support 
for ‘reconciliation’ and the TRC (Braithwaite et al. 
2010, 86). After a consultative committee assessed 
and concluded there was public support for a truth 
commission, a steering committee was established 
to consult with relevant stakeholders in the peace 
and reconciliation process and to draft the TRC 
Bill. Parliament passed the TRC Act in 2008, and 
in 2009 the commission was hurriedly prepared to 
be officially launched by Desmond Tutu during his 
pending visit. The rush to launch the TRC meant it 
began on the back foot, working tirelessly to meet 
day-to-day operational challenges, to the neglect of 
broader conceptual considerations. A former staff 
member told of his attempt to delay the launch of 
the TRC, but:
[I] could sense that it would be really 
embarrassing for the government if Tutu 
came and there was no TRC … We were not 
prepared. The logistics were not there, we 
didn’t have the mechanisms or the processes 
in place when we decided to get started … I 
feel that we could have done better. We didn’t 
have the opportunity to be able to really 
think through how we are going to make 
the concept of truth and truth-seeking and 
reconciliation work in the Solomon Islands.12
Momentum generated from the highly 
publicised launch in April 2009 dwindled as the 
TRC was then delayed until the arrival of the 
international commissioners in October. When the 
TRC officially began its operations in 2010, RAMSI 
had been present in the country for over six 
years. Peace, in a limited sense, had been restored 
and the ‘tension trials’ were mostly complete. 
The context the TRC was eventually established 
in was therefore vastly different from the one in 
which it was conceived. Susan Harris-Rimmer 
suggests that from a peacebuilding perspective, the 
Solomon Islands TRC was unusual, geared as it was 
towards nation-building rather than accountability 
(2010, 9).
The commission comprised five 
commissioners: three nationals and two non-
nationals, as stipulated by the Act. The foreign 
commissioners were chosen through a United 
Nations recruitment process and included 
a prominent leader from Fiji and a former 
commissioner from the TRC in Peru. The three 
national commissioners were chosen to represent 
the three provinces most affected by the conflict: 
Guadalcanal, Malaita and Western Province. Two 
of the commissioners were female.
The TRC was established as an independent 
statutory authority with an initial time frame of 
one year, which was later extended to two years. 
Its mandate was to ‘promote national unity and 
reconciliation’ through examining the nature, 
antecedents, root causes, and accountability or 
responsibility for and the extent of the human 
rights violations or abuses that occurred between 
1 January 1998 and RAMSI’s arrival on 23 July 
2003. It was also mandated to consider the impacts 
on the health, education, and legal and other 
sectors, and to devise policy options that may 
prevent repetitions or similar situations in the 
future (TRC Act, 5[1]). The commission’s functions 
included investigation and reporting on the causes, 
nature and extent of the violations and abuses that 
occurred during the tensions (TRC Act, 5[2a]). 
The commission was also mandated to ‘work to 
restore the human dignity of victims and promote 
reconciliation’ by providing an opportunity for 
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victims and perpetrators to give personal accounts 
of their experiences, ‘creating a climate which 
fosters constructive interchange between victims 
and perpetrators’ (TRC Act, 5[2c]). The mandate 
stipulated that special attention be given to the 
subject of sexual abuses and the experiences of 
children within the conflict. The commission was 
not able to provide amnesties or compensation.
To achieve its mandate, the commission con-
ducted statement taking across the country and 
compiled these data into a central database. It also 
conducted regional and thematic public hearings, 
which were televised and relayed on the radio; 
research and investigations; closed hearings; and 
exhumations. The findings of the commission were 
produced in a final report which offered a narra-
tive of the conflict and its antecedents, and docu-
mented excerpts of the statements, testimony and 
transcripts of the public hearings. The report also 
presented an analysis of human rights violations 
during the conflict and provided recommendations 
to the Solomon Islands Government on ‘policy 
options or measures that may prevent similar situ-
ations or a repetition of such events in the future’ 
(TRC Act, 5[1d]). Upon completion, the commis-
sion was mandated to hand the final report to the 
prime minister who, upon receiving the report, 
was to ‘cause it to be laid before Parliament and the 
report be made available to the public’ and ‘as far as 
practicable implement the recommendations of the 
report’ (TRC Act, 17[1–4]).
In February 2012, the commission presented 
its five-volume final report to Solomon Islands 
Prime Minister Gordon Darcy Lilo at an official 
ceremony in Honiara. The prime minister accepted 
the report, saying that ‘it marks the closure 
of an important chapter to a long process of 
reconciliation and truth-seeking’ (Island Sun 2012). 
Dozens of copies of the hefty report were hurriedly 
printed to meet the deadline and provided to 
the government; however, it was not released or 
tabled in parliament. Public calls for its official 
release have been, and continue to be, made in the 
national newspapers and on prominent Solomon 
Islands social media websites such as Forum 
Solomon Islands International.
In April 2013, the final report was unofficially 
released electronically by its editor, Bishop Terry 
Brown, who was critical of the government’s silence 
and inaction. In a public release Brown stated that 
since the handover of the final report:
the Prime Minster has refused to pass on the 
Report to Parliament, citing at different times 
its large size and ‘sensitivity’. The Report has 
not even been shared with the Ministry of 
National Reconciliation, Unity and Peace, 
who would have the primary responsibility 
for implementing it. (Brown 2013)
Brown disagreed with the government’s claim that 
the report’s release will reignite conflict in the 
country:
I do not believe this. The Report is very 
accurate and comprehensive and gives proper 
recognition to the victims of the conflict 
whose stories should be heard. It is not good 
enough to forgive the perpetrators and forget 
the victims, which seems to be the approach 
of the Government. (Brown 2013)
More than a year after being unofficially released, 
the report has been accessed by Solomon Islanders 
and foreigners worldwide. At the time of writing, 
Prime Minister Lilo has yet to publicly release 
the report, table it in parliament or address its 
recommendations.
5. (Mis)translating Truth and Reconciliation in 
Solomon Islands
As TRCs proliferate in post-conflict situations, 
earlier commissions serve as templates for later 
iterations, resulting in a set of international, 
globalised norms. While some adjustments are 
made to the structure and function of TRCs to 
better suit local demands, the normative discourse 
underlying transitional justice — that truth-telling 
is cathartic and leads to reconciliation, justice and 
peace — continues relatively unchanged (Millar 
2011, 178). Meanwhile, the meaning and value of 
both ‘truth’ and ‘reconciliation’ are translated, or 
vernacularised, into the local contexts in which 
they are implemented, resulting in different 
expectations and experiences in each circumstance. 







In practice, the Solomon Islands TRC suffered 
from a lack of definition or clarity of how ‘truth’ 
and ‘reconciliation’ are translated, defined and 
valued locally. Conflating both terms into the one 
process and title, without a clear definition relevant 
to the Solomon Islands context, served to set 
unrealistic and ambitious expectations of what the 
TRC would do or achieve.
Truth
Truth-seeking was a valued goal for earlier truth 
commissions in contexts where truth had been 
strategically concealed or withheld by governments, 
dictators or ruling parties. In these cases, providing 
a public account of violations was believed to 
be a form of justice itself, as it offered a means 
to acknowledgement and accountability, which 
had previously been denied (Millar 2011, 180). 
Following the widely publicised South African 
TRC and its emphasis on public hearings and 
‘reconciliation’, the process of truth-seeking in 
earlier commissions was largely replaced by truth-
telling (ibid.). Yet debates persist over the universal 
applicability of the purported benefits of truth, 
and whether the consequences of truth-seeking 
are indeed positive, inconsequential, or dangerous 
(Brahm 2007; Mendeloff 2004). Arguments 
for truth-telling draw on Western models of 
psychotherapy to suggest the process is cathartic, 
and assume that participants are ‘autonomous 
individuals with the capacity to choose freely how 
to engage in institutional processes’ (Ross 2010, 
75). As Priscilla Hayner notes, it is often asserted 
that ‘simply giving victims and witnesses a chance 
to tell their stories to an official commission … can 
help them regain their dignity and begin to recover’ 
(2011, 146).
Many statement takers in the Solomon Islands 
TRC spoke of encountering resistance to truth-
telling for its own, cathartic sake; as one explained: 
‘This idea that people can tell their stories and 
then they feel free … I think in Melanesian culture, 
that doesn’t really work. Unless there is some kind 
of compensation. Most people did not want to 
give their statement.’13 The act of asking about the 
conflict was considered largely incongruent with 
local kastom, as another statement taker explained:
Actually, statement taking contradicts some 
of our culture in Solomon Islands. Here, what 
you find, is that anything in the past from 
a long time ago, people like to forget and 
don’t want to talk about it. They’ll say, ‘oh, it’s 
finished’. In the area I worked in, I found that 
the statement takers always came across a 
challenge where the people say ‘what are you 
doing with what we tell you?’ Because it’s part 
of their tradition and culture, so you should 
put in place something. Traditionally you 
would use pigs or money, we call it a chupu 
[form of compensation in Guadalcanal]. You 
must do that before you ask questions from 
a long time ago. So it’s really contradicting 
our people, to go and dig back and talk about 
something that’s already past.14
Fiona Ross highlights the limitations of the 
cathartic model for women’s involvement in 
the South African TRC, arguing that ‘it is not 
necessarily a universal or transhistorical model 
and does not take account of the diversity of ways 
in which experience is articulated or otherwise 
made known and addressed’ (2010, 82). Ross’s 
explanation of how this impacted women’s 
testimony at the South African TRC — with 
many choosing silence — resonates with women’s 
experience of the Solomon Islands TRC:
In contexts in which women are often blamed 
for the harm they experience, especially when 
that harm is sexual, it ought not be surprising 
that many would prefer not to speak, or 
find themselves unable to do so, particularly 
when doing so incriminates not just another 
individual, but a set of cultural assumptions 
and the social forms that they shape. It takes 
courage both to speak of harms done and to 
be silent in their face and aftermath. (Ross 
2010, 81)
Female statement takers at the Solomon Islands 
TRC echoed this sentiment, explaining that their 
local cultures and kastoms prohibited disclosure 
about personal and sensitive topics, making their 
job difficult. A women’s submission to the TRC 
noted the value and meaning of women’s silence: 
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‘For women, sometimes their silence is louder, 
stronger and safer than anything they say out loud 
because of the risks involved in telling their stories’ 
(Fangalasuu et al. 2011, 13).
Traditional taboos, kastom and culture 
may inhibit what ‘truth’ Solomon Islanders feel 
comfortable to discuss and public truth-telling 
is not necessarily the most appropriate means in 
which to gather information: ‘Finding a voice in 
which to speak and a linguistic form that might 
do justice to experience is thus not simple’ (Ross 
2010, 83). During research in the villages of the 
Weathercoast, south Guadalcanal, for example, 
women would readily recount the loss of their 
gardens, the pillage of their pigs and crops, and the 
destruction of their kitchen and utensils as major 
abuses they endured during the conflict. Stories 
of personal or sexual violence were much less 
forthcoming. Speaking in their roles as mothers 
and providers for their families was an accessible 
and acceptable standpoint for their narratives of 
trauma. Sexual violence, or other human rights 
violations such as killings, torture and ill-treatment, 
however, were not topics that could be discussed 
easily, if at all.
On a positive note, it was generally agreed 
among interviewees that documenting ‘truth’ — 
as in the narrative and events of the conflict and 
the people and parties involved — was a positive 
outcome of the commission. Although there 
was no formal policy of secrecy, many Solomon 
Islanders were unaware of — and curious about 
— the events and details of the conflict, for 
reasons such as the isolation of the most affected 
communities, fear instilled in many victims, the 
continuing presence of ex-combatants in some 
communities, and the cultural practices of shame 
and silence which may prohibit disclosure after an 
issue has been reconciled. One staff member said 
that for her, attending a public hearing was:
A unique experience, because as a Solomon 
Islander, and I stay in Honiara, I hear 
rumours only, about what happened. I didn’t 
experience the ethnic tensions first hand … 
I just heard about it only and I saw it on the 
news and heard about it on the radio, like 
that. But for me to actually come face to face 
with the victims, no. This public hearing, it 
changed how I see the crisis that happened.15
Another interviewee noted that while people talked 
among themselves about what was happening 
during the conflict, that ‘cultural reconciliation 
doesn’t deal with truth’. In this regard, the TRC 
had potential to create a legitimate space to have a 
directed discussion and ‘a chance to deal with what 
happened and why’.16
While globally ‘the truth business, in short, 
is booming’, critics question whether it is feasible 
to even ‘establish anything that should actually be 
called, with a straight face, “truth” ’ (Tepperman 
2002, 129–39). The nature of truth is a ‘complex and 
elusive concept’, especially in post-conflict, divided 
societies, and defining truth a contentious task 
(Chapman 2009a, 96). The final report of a TRC 
and the ‘truth’ it documents must be understood 
in the context in which it was produced. With 
a mandate guiding the topics, themes and time 
periods to be examined, the Solomon Islands 
TRC was limited to hearing a certain truth, 
framed by particular questions centred on human 
rights as defined in international law but not yet 
frequently adopted or accepted by Solomon Islands 
communities. One statement taker explained how 
she translated the questions on the statement 
taking forms so they would be culturally acceptable 
to discuss:
We turn the questions around, make it 
inside a story or so forth, so that they can 
tell their story. Because I think some of the 
questions about the human rights violations, 
they are really very direct questions … Some 
other statement takers I worked with, in the 
workshop, we talked about that too. We talked 
about how even though we have these direct 
questions, we must not directly ask them. You 
must talk around the question, or put it in a 
story, then at the end you can ask it.17
While the statement takers worked hard to 
navigate these frictions, translating not just the 
form’s questions into vernacular but asking them in 
a culturally acceptable way, the overall methodology 







of the TRC was not in accord with the context and 
could have been better adapted to fit the nature of 
research and reconciliation in Solomon Islands. 
Approaching villages and asking for ‘victims of 
the conflict’ to come forward and document a 
statement was perceived by many statement takers 
to be incongruent with local kastoms and protocols 
for conflict resolution. The lack of anonymity in 
villages also precluded the ability to conduct the 
process in a safe and secure environment. Many 
Solomon Islanders were hesitant to participate, 
so staff explained that the TRC would compile a 
final report, including recommendations for future 
policy, reforms and reparations, based on the 
information it gathered. Without this opportunity 
to lobby for future benefits, many would not have 
provided statements (Vella 2014, 7).
The subsequent data analysis, which was 
framed primarily around human rights, was 
also ill-fitting for the context and a strain on the 
TRC’s limited resources and staff capacity. The 
statements received by the TRC were translated 
and analysed into this human rights framework; 
boxes were ticked according to which of the 
human rights violations were identified in the 
statement giver’s story.18 While standard to 
global discourses of transitional justice and a 
worthwhile task itself, documenting narratives 
of the conflict in human rights language and 
frameworks, which do not resonate in Solomon 
Islands communities, risks isolating the very people 
the TRC aims to reach. Hayner acknowledges 
that the standard methodology of TRCs in the 
form of taking detailed testimony to be fed into 
a database requires so much energy that ‘this 
approach tends to define the very nature of a truth 
commission process, and through its coding and 
data entry sheets, the truth that the commission 
will collect’ (2011, 82). Instead, she asks if it would 
be worthwhile for future truth commissions to 
reconsider their methodology and not simply 
follow the path of previous commissions. Indeed, 
if ‘reconciliation’ or peacebuilding are the goals or 
intended outcomes of the TRC process, then for 
a Melanesian context, the methodology of a truth 
commission would need to be seriously reworked.
In a country where storytelling is a familiar and 
valued component of local reconciliation practices, 
government-sanctioned national truth-telling has 
potential as a means of reconciliation in Solomon 
Islands. Documenting the ‘truth’ and producing a 
final report, however, cannot be the end goal: the 
potential of a TRC for peacebuilding in Melanesia 
depends on the process in which the stories are 
told and received, and how that information 
is used for future action and justice, such as 
through the adoption and implementation of the 
recommendations (Vella 2014, 10). Reflecting on 
previous truth commissions, this was recognised 
by advocates of the Solomon Islands TRC at the 
outset: ‘From the experiences of other transitional 
societies, it is critical to the long-term success 
of the peace process that the recommendations 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission be 
mandatory on the government for implementation’ 
(SICA 2002, 4).
Reconciliation
The Solomon Islands TRC used the term 
‘reconciliation’ in its title and as a key objective 
in its mandate, yet did not define the term. In the 
peacebuilding literature, reconciliation suffers from 
a lack of definitional clarity: its ‘basic problem 
is that no-one agrees how to define it or do it’ 
(Bloomfield 2006, 4). In the transitional justice 
discourse, ‘the strength of a truth commission 
process is in advancing reconciliation on a national 
or political level’ (Hayner 2011, 183). As already 
mentioned, the term ‘reconciliation’ is widely 
used in Pijin and Solomon Islanders have a strong 
understanding of how to ‘do’ reconciliation, usually 
through Christian and customary processes on 
personal, familial or communal levels. Rather than 
pursue large-scale ‘national’ reconciliation, Joy 
Kere, then permanent secretary of the Ministry for 
National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace noted:
reconciliation has to happen within the 
provinces, not just between them — it has to 
happen within communities and families … 
Much of the killing, atrocities, and violence 
occurred within extended families. We have 
to rebuild, ward by ward, community by 
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community, tribe by tribe, family by family. 
(Kere in McDougall and Kere 2011, 144)
At its conception, a reconciliation program was 
a priority of the commission’s work. Reconciliation 
was seen at the time by SICA to be comparable 
to restorative justice processes that would occur 
alongside the truth process: ‘It does not await 
the end of the issuing or publication of the truth 
report’ (SICA 2002, 11). The reconciliation process 
was to involve a combination of custom law and 
chiefs as well as churches (ibid.). Later, the Steering 
Committee’s background and terms of reference of 
the TRC also reflected a holistic understanding of 
reconciliation, proposing it aims to ‘transform and 
rebuild public confidence in the state institutions’; 
resides in ‘the substantial redress of past inequities 
in social and economic justice’; integrates rather 
than suppresses victims’ feelings such as ‘anger, 
sorrow and trauma’; and ‘tackle[s] the deep rooted 
social imbalances which at the most fundamental 
structural level, underpins the culture of violence’ 
(TRCSC 2008, 27). The TRC Act, however, did not 
stipulate how reconciliation would be conducted or 
promoted, but implied that it would manifest as a 
result of the TRC’s truth-seeking activities.
Including the term ‘reconciliation’ in the title 
of the TRC gestured towards a process of reconcili-
ation, as understood locally, which was ultimately 
misleading, as one interviewee explained:
Initially I found it hard to understand 
what the concept behind [the TRC] was. 
But the thing that stood out was the word 
‘reconciliation’. I mean, that word comes out 
any time the country goes through some 
turmoil. So when I looked at the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission, that word 
‘reconciliation’ stood out in my mind. I 
thought it would be something to make 
everyone reconcile ... When I look around, 
people around the country and surrounding 
me, they had the same impression which 
I initially had. That this would be about 
reconciliation. But as I later realised when I 
went through my work, I saw that ok, it’s just 
promoting reconciliation, but it’s not doing 
reconciliation.19
The purpose of seeking truth was generally 
assumed to be in relation to a process of facilitating 
reconciliation, and not for the documentation of 
the conflict or the purported cathartic effect of 
truth-telling alone. In the minds of many workers 
at the TRC there was to be a distinct reconciliation 
program, which just never eventuated. A 
reconciliation program conducted alongside the 
truth-seeking program would have encouraged 
greater ownership over the whole process:
For example, with the TRC now, what we 
are doing now is that we have written a 
report and submitted it to government, and 
then after reconciliation will happen. That 
is how I understand the process now. But I 
think if we want people involved in it, and 
at the same time to give people ownership, 
I think sometimes it’s good for us to spend 
some money to bring together people from 
the villages.20
When it became clearer to TRC staff that the 
commission was not going to initiate or facilitate 
reconciliation as practised locally, hopes were, and 
arguably still are, pinned on the recommendations 
in the final report. As a statement taker explained, 
without the ‘exchange’ of government-lead 
reconciliation in return for their stories, those 
who gave their statements feel short-changed, and 
contrary to the ideal goal of reconciliation are 
further angered by the government’s inaction: ‘What 
the TRC did, most people are not really satisfied 
with. They said, “what’s the outcome where you 
come and take our stories only?” So that’s people 
inside the communities, they are stuck now.’21
While reconciliation processes and ceremonies 
vary across Solomon Islands, the TRC had potential 
to facilitate ‘reconciliation’ as understood locally. As 
Braithwaite et al. (2010, 148) noted in their study, 
the TRC had potential to ‘reconnect citizens to 
thinking about reconciliation as something people 
do between one another, and communities do with 
each other’. For the TRC to have fulfilled this role, 
however, it needed a thoughtful and dedicated 
reconciliation program and, arguably, a longer time 
period in which to operate.22







6. Veneer of Adaptation: Leaving Localised 
Peacebuilding Behind
The Solomon Islands TRC began with potential 
to be ‘hybridised’ — operated and contextualised 
for the Solomon Islands setting. Initial planning 
documents by the Steering Committee noted the 
importance of the TRC reflecting the ‘unique 
situation of a country’ (TRCSC 2008, 13) and 
‘looking into developing sensitivities to traditional 
and grassroots practices and build these to achieve 
meaningful post-conflict reconstruction that 
is sustainable’ (TRCSC 2008, 14). These initial 
aspirations displayed promising ideals but were not 
realised. In practice there was a veneer of adaptation 
— ceremony and theatre which presented an image 
of congruence with local culture but with little more 
than a token commitment to kastom and indigenous 
reconciliation practices. From its conception, 
the TRC was driven by two mutually reinforcing 
influences, both navigating the TRC away from the 
civil society and church network initiatives which 
saw the TRC introduced, and leading it away from 
the people whom it was intended to benefit.
The first influence was that of globalised 
and standardised discourses on post-conflict 
peacebuilding. While introducing a TRC was itself 
a result of looking to external ideas for solutions 
or inspiration, there was potential for the Solomon 
Islands effort to hybridise the imported TRC 
with local symbols and understanding. Instead, 
the TRC moved towards the other end of the 
continuum, ‘replicating’ a model TRC by adopting 
its organisation, mission and ideology (Merry 
2006, 44). Introducing institutions into Solomon 
Islands follows a long history of what Larmour 
(2005, 1) terms ‘institutional transfer’ into the 
Pacific. The transfer, or replication, is not just from 
one country to another, but:
the Pacific Islands have also suffered from 
the partial application of idealized and 
standardized models with no particular 
national origins. Colonization, decolonization, 
fiscal crises, and membership in international 
organizations have made the islands open to 
prevailing ideas of ‘best practice’. (Larmour 
2005, 1)
The notion of ‘best practice’ adds further 
to a sense of placelessness, as ‘best practice’ is 
advised by international organisations (Larmour 
2005, 3), such as the International Center for 
Transitional Justice in the case of the TRC. Rather 
than relying so heavily on external support and 
previous conceptions of truth commissions, the 
Solomon Islands TRC would have benefited from 
interpreting the mandate in a manner unique to the 
local context. The TRC needed more research to 
‘not just be implemented the usual way that TRCs 
have been applied before. [It needed] more research 
of TRCs and the practices that we already have in 
the country, and try to make it appropriate to the 
way of Solomon Islands.’23
The second influence was the shift in respon-
sibility of the TRC, from its conception by civil 
society and church networks to implementation 
by the government with assistance from interna-
tional actors. Following the passage of the TRC 
Act, the TRC clearly became a responsibility of the 
government and largely left, or was left by, civil 
society actors. With more than 90 per cent of Solo-
mon Islanders holding allegiance to one of the five 
Christian denominations which form SICA, apart 
from structures of traditional society, the churches 
‘are the most significant institution, with broad 
networks that reach to the grassroots’ (Pollard and 
Wale 2004, 591). Those who initially advocated for 
a TRC did not foresee the commission operating 
independently from the churches as it eventually 
did, as one interviewee said:
In the early days, it was never perceived as the 
TRC operating really without operating hand 
in glove with the community-level churches. 
And I don’t think that ever happened. Once 
the TRC set off on its own path, the churches 
rightly or wrongly, in a sense, they abandoned 
the TRC, or the TRC abandoned them.24
Rather than being located in civil society, as it 
operated, the TRC was often seen as an arm of the 
government by communities:
If you go to the meetings or the hearings, [the 
communities] always refer to this TRC as 
part of the government. No matter how many 
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awareness we do. That I definitely noticed. 
And sometimes people talk about, and ask, is 
it independent?25
Churches, local leaders and civil society 
networks led much of the meaningful 
reconciliation prior to RAMSI, illustrating the trust 
accorded them as mediators and peacemakers. 
Meanwhile, many Solomon Islanders affected 
by the tensions lay blame for the conflict and its 
consequences at the hands of the government. In 
the absence of a continuing champion or advocate 
for the TRC, this shift from the civil society to the 
government had a marked impact on its eventual 
operation. Initial ideals for the TRC fell to the 
wayside as the TRC Act became the mandate by 
which the institution was to be established. While 
the government’s endorsement provided necessary 
authority and legitimacy to the commission 
and demonstrated an overall commitment to 
peacebuilding in the country, it did not have the 
leadership or the conviction to promote its work 
and garner community support.
Conclusion
Being a popular transnational and globalised post-
conflict mechanism does not necessarily exclude 
truth commissions from potentially meaningful 
work in Solomon Islands, or Melanesia. As one 
interviewee argued: ‘It’s an excuse for us — to say 
it’s a foreign idea, and it’s a bad idea. The only thing 
we [should] do, I think it’s a good idea to adapt the 
TRC. It’s a good idea.’26 When it was introduced in 
2000, the Solomon Islands TRC showed a potential 
path forward to encourage reconciliation during 
a time of crisis. Its eventual implementation, 
however, suffered a number of challenges — both 
conceptual and practical. The TRC was constantly 
occupied managing its day-to-day operations in 
a difficult working environment typical of the 
context. Submitting the final report was indeed 
a tremendous achievement, even despite the 
unwillingness, to date, of the government to 
release it publicly. The conceptual challenges of 
a TRC, however, seem to have been given little 
attention in its implementation. The meaning and 
value of truth and reconciliation in the Solomon 
Islands context were not adequately localised and, 
as a result, the TRC did not benefit from the local 
ownership necessary for genuine reconciliation 
processes in the Solomon Islands.
Coming under the banner of ‘restorative 
justice’, the values underlying TRCs are potentially 
congruent with conflict resolution processes 
in Solomon Islands (Dinnen 2003) — with an 
emphasis on restoring relationships, promoting 
reconciliation, and storytelling. If appropriately 
and sensitively adapted to a Melanesian context 
with more than a token commitment to cultural 
understandings of truth, reconciliation and justice, 
the TRC could potentially have served three 
distinct and separate functions. First, truth-seeking 
and documentation of a narrative of the conflict 
and events which occurred; second, officially 
sanctioning a space for which the process of 
reconciliation could begin, or continue to occur; 
and third, to provide recommendations for policy 
reform and reparations, thus linking the collection 
of truth to future action. While truth-telling is 
problematic in Solomon Islands, producing a 
narrative of the conflict was largely agreed to be a 
beneficial outcome. For reconciliation, however, 
what is more important is what then happens with 
the stories, or the ‘truth’ which is found.
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effectiveness for achieving truth and reconciliation 
and as a means of building peace. 
Email: louise.vella@outlook.com.
Endnotes
1 Access to full text of the TRC Act is available 
at <http://www.paclii.org/sb/legis/num_act/
tarca2008371/>.
2 Statement taking was conducted in Guadalcanal, 
Malaita, Western, Choiseul, Makira and Temotu 
provinces. Plans to also visit Isabel, Central and 
Renbel provinces were not realised due to time and 
monetary constraints.
3 Interviews were conducted in a combination 
of English and Pijin. All translations are my 
own. Interviews were open-ended and in depth, 
resembling a conversation or ‘storying’. Interview 
participants included statement takers, data entry 
staff, researchers, exhumation officers, officer 
managers, administrative officers and commissioners, 
as well as personnel employed with non-government 
organisations or the United Nations Development 
Programme who worked closely with the TRC, and 
those involved with its establishment. Many of the 
interviewees worked on the ground, implementing 
TRC activities at the village, community and 
government level and acted as ‘translators’ of global 
ideas about human rights for local sociocultural 
understandings (see Merry 2006). For further details 
of the research methodology see Vella (2011).
4 For detailed overviews of the conflict see Allen 
(2013), Fraenkel (2004) or Moore (2004).
5 The TRC final report lists the names of 200 people 
whose violent deaths were attributed to the conflict.
6 Interview with John Roughan, Honiara, 2012.
7 For more on RAMSI see Coppel (2012). For 
discussion and analysis of the intervention see 
Barbara (2008) and Allen and Dinnen (2010).
8 See TRC Act (Endnote 1) and TRCSC (2008).
9 See the International Center for Transitional Justice 
website, <http://ictj.org/about/transitional-justice>, 
viewed 20/12/2013.
10 Interview with TRC research officer, Honiara, 2012.
11 Interview with former SICA Peace Committee 
member, Honiara, 2012.
12 Interview with former TRC manager, Honiara, 2012.
13 Interview with TRC statement taker, Honiara, 2012.
14 Interview with TRC statement taker, Honiara, 2012.
15 Interview with TRC staff member, Honiara, 2012.
16 Interview with former SICA Peace Committee 
member, Honiara, 2012.
17 Interview with TRC statement taker, Honiara, 2012.
18 The commission identified six human rights 
violations that were considered common to the 
conflict and included on the statement taker forms: 
killings, abduction and illegal detention, torture and 
ill-treatment, sexual violence, property violation and 
forced displacement.
19 Interview with TRC stakeholder staff, Honiara, 2012. 
Emphasis added.
20 Interview with TRC statement taker, Honiara, 2012.
21 Interview with TRC statement taker, Honiara, 2012.
22 Many interviewees noted towards the end of the 
TRC’s operation that the public was beginning to 
understand and trust the commission and its work, 
and expressed desire for the commission to continue.
23 Interview with TRC stakeholder staff, Honiara, 2012.
24 Interview with former SICA Peace Commission 
member, Honiara, 2012.
25 Interview with TRC stakeholder staff, Honiara, 2012.
26 Interview with TRC researcher, Honiara, 2012.
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